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Abstract
This study investigates the quote dynamics of stocks listed and traded in two international fully-
synchronized markets. We develop a general model for quote dynamics of assets traded in dual
markets to assess how quotes react to liquidity shocks and trade-related information. We further
develop this model to extract the implied vector autoregression for the spreads, the e¢ cient price,
and the relative premium between the two markets. Applying our model to a sample of 64 Canadian
stocks listed both in the U.S. and Canada, we observe a strong evidence of cross-market error-
correcting behavior of spreads on the bid and ask quotes, indicating some degree of intermarket
competition between liquidity providers. We also nd that trade-related information does not
a¤ect quotes across market directly, indicating that even though the prices in the two markets are
cointegrated, the two markets are still informationally segmented. Microstructure fundamentals
such as changes in midpoint (implied e¢ cient price) and the di¤erence in midquotes (relative
premium) are driven by liquidity and trade-related information from each of the two markets with
the U.S contributing more than Canada.
JEL Classication: C32, G15
Keywords: Market Microstructure; Error-correction; Quote Dynamics, Cross-listings
1 Introduction
This paper examines price dynamics of cross-listed stocks. Given the growing trend of cross-
listings by rms in recent years, it is important to understand what drives prices in di¤erent
markets.1 Because only the trading venue di¤ers, the prices of these assets should be linked by
having the same fundamental value and be a¤ected by the same underlying factors. As discussed
in Lieberman et al. (1999), Baillie et al. (2002), and Pascual et al. (2006), prices of cross-listed
stocks are cointegrated and share a common e¢ cient price. Hence, the price in any given market
should be determined by information being revealed in any of these markets. Consequently, prices
in these markets are driven by the same information.
Market microstructure research focuses on the process of how the arrival of new information leads
to updates in investorsexpectation about the value of a stock. In response to new information,
liquidity providers update their prices, resulting in price change. Such price dynamics in relation to
information arrival has been documented in various studies, most notably Glosten (1987), OHara
(1995), Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001), and Engle and Patton (2004). While the existing
studies focus on price dynamics within a single market, what is currently lacking is an understanding
of the price dynamics of cross-listed assets.
In this paper, we develop a general model for quote dynamics of assets traded in dual markets.
In this model, the dynamics of quotes are a¤ected by two important sources - liquidity shocks
and trade-related information (see e.g. Demsetz, 1968; Bagehot, 1971; Biais et al., 1995). This
model allows us to evaluate whether liquidity shocks and trade-related information a¤ect quotes
directly in both markets, and can be used to assess the degree of information spillover between
the two markets and whether the markets are informationally integrated. Our model builds on the
framework of cointegrated quotes as commonly applied in the literature (see for example Engle and
Patton, 2004; Escribano and Pascual, 2006; and Frijns and Schotman, 2009). Specically, we use
a VECM with four equations representing bid and ask quote revisions in two di¤erent markets.
We allow these quote revisions to be a function of market liquidity (such as bid-ask spread and
depth di¤erence), and trade-related information (i.e. trade direction, size, duration, and order
1See for example Pagano et al. (2002), Halling et al. (2008) and Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) for evidences of
cross-listings.
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ow). As a further contribution, we show how our model can be transformed into an implied vector
autoregression (VAR) for the bid-ask spreads in the two markets, the midpoint of prices and the
di¤erence in midquotes across markets.2 These variables provide important information about a
cross-listed asset. The spread is a key measure of the amount of friction in the market, while the
midpoint of quotes of the two markets represents the implied e¢ cient price of the asset. In addition,
the cross-market di¤erence in midquotes represents the relative premium of trading in one market
over another.
Applying our model to Canadian stocks that are cross-listed in the U.S., we document several
important ndings. First, we observe strong evidence of cross-market error-correcting behavior
of spreads on the bid and ask quotes. This suggests some degree of intermarket competition
between liquidity providers. Depth di¤erence, on the other hand, only conveys information in
the home market. Second, we nd that even though prices in the two markets are cointegrated,
they are still informationally segmented. Trade-related information does not a¤ect quotes across
market directly, but indirectly through the movements it causes in home market quotes. Third,
we nd that liquidity and trade-related information play a greater role in the U.S than in Canada.
Furthermore, the implied VAR shows that trades in the U.S have a greater impact on the midpoint
(implied e¢ cient price) and the di¤erence in midquotes than trades in Canada.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature. In
Section 3, we present the model for the quote dynamics. In Section 4, we describe the data. In
Section 5, we analyze the empirical results of the quote model as well as the design and ndings of
the implied model. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2A similar structure has been proposed by Engle and Patton (2004). In their study, the VECM model is trans-
formed into an implied VAR for the bid-ask spread and quote midpoint. Our multi-market quote revision model
extends their anaylsis by constructing the bid-ask spreads in each of the markets, the midpoint of prices of the two
markets, and the cross-market di¤erence in midquotes.
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2 Literature Review
A large body of market microstructure research builds on the notion that new information leads
to updates in markets expectation about the fundamental value of an asset. Movements in the
bid and ask quotes reect such changes. We argue in this paper that quote dynamics in markets
is a¤ected by two sources - liquidity shocks and trade-related information. As such, we start this
section with a discussion on how liquidity a¤ects quotes, and then turn to the impact of trade-
related information on quote behavior. Next, we show how these variables also a¤ect quotes in
multiple markets.
Market microstructure theory suggests that there is a linkage between liquidity and quote dynamics.
Liquidity refers to the degree to which an asset can be bought or sold in the market without a¤ecting
that assets price. One measure of liquidity is the bid-ask spread, which is the di¤erence between the
market makers ask and bid prices. Demsetz (1968) calls this the cost of "immediacy" of exchange
in organized markets. Investors who require immediacy to purchase an asset need to pay the market
makers ask price, while those who wish to sell need to agree with the market makers bid price.
Therefore, the spread represents a cost to investors and a prot to market makers. The bid-ask
spread is shown to a¤ect bid and ask quotes through error-correcting behavior - a large spread at
the previous quote leads to a rise in the bid price and a fall in the ask price at the following quote,
to restore the spread to its long-run equilibrium value. Jang and Venkatesh (1991) indicate this
error-correcting behavior of which spread is more likely to decrease when the spread is greater than
some threshold, and more likely to increase when it is below some threshold.
Another measure of liquidity which is typically assessed in the literature is the di¤erence in quoted
depth. Depth is the ability of an asset to absorb buy and sell orders without the price dramatically
moving in either direction. Huang and Stoll (1994) suggest that the di¤erence between the depth
at the ask and the depth at the bid conveys important information. In line with the adverse-
information model in market microstructure, high depth at ask relative to bid indicates an excess
number of sellers relative to buyers, signalling that the stock is overpriced (signalling e¤ect). A
similar outcome can be explained by the proposition that higher depth at the ask relative to bid
also means less trade volume is required before a downward movement than an upward movement,
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making a downward movement in prices more likely, leading to lower ask and bid prices (barrier
e¤ect).
Market microstructure theory also suggests that stock prices are a¤ected by information that comes
from trades. This concept was originally suggested by Bagehot (1971), who explains the importance
of information for market prices. In the context of information-based models, a market comprises
of both informed and uninformed traders. Trades by informed traders would result the market
maker to lose on average to these traders. This implies that trades could reveal information and
a¤ect the movements in prices. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) explain that in a competitive market,
informed agentstrades will reect their information, either selling if they know bad news or buying
if they know good news. Therefore, the direction of trade is informative. As the market maker
receives trades, his expectation of the assetsvalue changes, and this, in turn, causes him to update
his price. In addition, Jang and Venkatesh (1991) show how the market maker revises his quotes
following a transaction. For instance, following a transaction at the bid price, both the bid and the
ask quotes will be revised downward for two reasons. First, based on the inventory cost reason,
the market maker wants to discourage further public sales and encourage public purchases in order
to square o¤ his inventory. Second, based on adverse selection reason, a trade at the bid price
indicates that some informed traders know that the true value of the asset is lower. Knowing that,
the market maker will subsequently lower his bid and ask quotes.
Apart from the direction of trade, information can also be gleaned from other trade-related features.
The rst of them is the information contained in trade size. Easley and OHara (1987) explain that
trade size induces an adverse selection problem, because given the same price, the informed traders
always prefers to trade larger quantities to maximize their expected prots. Since uninformed
traders do not share this size bias, a rational market maker will interpret large orders as a signal
that an information event has occurred and adjust prices accordingly by increasing his bid and ask
quotes. Barclay and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001), however, suggest that the informed
traders may prefer to trade in a size that is not too large and not too small in order to disguise
their trades as being informed (stealth trading). In such case, stock price changes should take place
on trades of medium size. The second feature is related to the trade duration. Easley and OHara
(1992) show that since trades provide signals of the direction of any new information, the lack of
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trade provides a signal of no new information (event uncertainty). Hence the absence of trade could
provide information to market participants. Dufour and Engle (2000) further nd that the duration
between trades is informative. Finally, signed order ow leads to changes in bid and ask prices. Kyle
(1985) proposes that because market makers cannot distinguish the individual quantities traded
by the insider or liquidity (noise) traders separately, nor do they have any other kind of special
information, they set prices based on the observations of the current and past aggregate quantities
traded by the insider and noise traders combined, known as the "order ow." As a consequence,
bid and ask quotes are also driven by order ow.
The above concepts have been used to explain dynamics of quotes, where bid and ask quotes
are modeled in simultanous equations as a cointegrated system, and each equation represents the
quote revision in either side of the market. Such models are used in assessing the movements in
quotes induced by the learning of the market makers and other liquidity suppliers responding to
new information. For example, Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) examine how NYSE specialists
update bid prices, ask prices, bid depths, and ask depths simultaneously. They nd that changes
in the best prices and depths on the limit order book have a signicant impact on each other.
The e¤ects of transactions and other market events (e.g. public liquidity providers placing limit
orders, and changes in the trading environment), on the other hand, are secondary. Engle and
Patton (2004) specify an error-correction model for the log di¤erence of the bid and the ask price
with the spread acting as the error-correction term, and include as regressors to characterize trades
occurring between quote observations. Their specication allows them to show that the dynamics
of bid-ask spread is heavily inuenced by the di¤erential response of bids and asks to buys and
sells; a buy has a greater impact on the ask price than on the bid price, while a sell has a greater
impact on the bid price than on the ask price. In addition, they nd that various trade-related and
liquidity shocks are able to explain the movements in bid and ask quotes. Furthermore, Escribano
and Pascual (2006) model the bid and ask quotes instead of using the quote midpoint to show
that bid and ask quotes do not move symmetrically and buys and sells are not equally informative.
These studies demonstrate the linkages between liquidity and trade-related information, and the
quote dynamics of an asset in single markets.
In this paper, we assess whether the above relations exist across di¤erent markets and what mech-
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anisms underlie such linkages. In the case of securities that are cross-listed and traded in more
than one stock market, prices are cointegrated, and changes in price in one market become the
source of price movement in another. Since bid and ask quotes make up prices, one can therefore
expect that quotes in one market are linked to quotes in another market. With this in mind, we
build on the framework of cointegrated quotes as applied in Engle and Patton (2004) and Escribano
and Pascual (2006). These studies employ an error-correction model between bid and ask quotes,
of which the quotes are cointegrated process with the bid-ask spread being the error-correction
term. The VECM is widely used to analyze asymmetries in the short-run impacts of trades on the
bid or ask price, and it is more dynamic since it controls for serial dependencies of the variables.
One appealing feature of the VECM is that it allows the cointegrating relationship to be known
as a priori, and therefore sets a very general parameterization of the model. Furthermore,it is
exible enough to accommodate further extension, such as a multimarket application. This will be
discussed further in the next section.
3 Dual-Market Quote Dynamics
In this section, we present the model for dual-market quote dynamics. We extend the VECM into
a dual-market setting and represent the bid and ask quotes in the two markets as simultaneous
equations in the joint system. Such setting is versatile and allows us to test various concepts in
market microstructure research. We follow the specication of Engle and Patton (2004) and allow
the quote revisions as a function of liquidity and trade-related variables, both of which reect the
mechanism of which information is aggregated and disseminated into quote dynamics.
We specify the model in terms of log-di¤erences, of which the log levels of the bid and ask quotes
in each market are cointegrated of order one. The model is dened in quote time which means
there is a new observation each time there is a change in quotes. The subscript, t denotes the
tth observation in the chronological sequence of quotes, while trades are indexed according to
the quote they precede: (t)   k indexes the kth most recent trade to quote observation t. We
include information on the three most recent trades as exogenous regressors in our model. The
function l(t) counts the number of trades occuring between quote t  1 and quote t. The following
equation is estimated using ordinary least squares and the standard errors are controlled for possible
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heteroskedasticity using Whites (1980) correction. The description of the variables considered for
this model are listed in Appendix (A.1).
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where c is a (41) vector of constants, A(j) are (44) matrices of AR coe¢ cients at lag j, B is
a (42) matrix of spreads coe¢ cients,  1 is a (42) matrix of depth di¤erence coe¢ cients,  (k)2
and  (k)3 are (46) matrices of trade-related variables at the kth most recent trade at the buy
and sell side, respectively,  4 is a (44) matrix of total trade coe¢ cients,  (d)5 are (41) vectors
of diurnalilty (intraday seasonality) coe¢ cients at time of the day d, and "t is a (41) vector of
innovations.
Microstructure data such as the changes in quote often show evidence of negative serial correlation
(Stoll, 2000). The inclusion of lags of the dependent variables and the trade variables will capture
this serial correlation. We employ ten lags of the dependent variables and nd that they are su¢ cient
to control for serial correlation. Both variables SPREAD and DEPTH_DIFF represent liquidity
shocks potentially a¤ecting quote revisions. The log-levels of the bid and ask series are generally
accepted to be cointegrated, with the log-spread being stationary. Naturally, the lagged spread is
chosen as an error-correction term for the bid and ask quotes. In addition, the di¤erence between
the depth at the ask and the depth at the bid is often taken as a measure of liquidity and conveys
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information through the signalling and barrier e¤ects as explained in the previous section.
Trade-related information such as trade direction, size, duration, and order ow lead to revisions in
bid and ask quotes. Market microstructure theory suggests that a buy has a positive impact on both
the bid and ask quotes, whereas a sell has a negative impact. We include BUY and SELL variables
to represent trades at both sides of the market. We follow the standard trade signing approach
of Lee and Ready (1991) and use contemporaneous quotes to sign trades, following Bessembinder
(2003). If the trade price was higher than the mid-quote, the trade is considered as a buy, while if
the trade price is lower than the mid-quote, the trade is considered as a sell. Trade that occurred
exactly at the mid-quote is considered indeterminate and given a value of zero.
With regard to trade size, studies show that medium volume trades drive most of the stock price
movements since informed traders break up their trades to remain inconspicuous. To represent the
medium size trades, we include a volume indicator, V med which takes a value one if the trade volume
was between 1,000 and 10,000 shares and zero otherwise. We do not employ an indicator for big
volume trade since they are extremely rare for our sample stocks (refer to Table 2 on the summary
statistics). Studies have also shown that short durations signal news events while long durations
signal neither bad nor good news. To capture the impact of trading intensity, we include trade
duration variable, D; which is calculated as the di¤erence in seconds between two successive trade
time stamps. The signed order ow variables
Pl(t)
k=1BUY(t) k and
Pl(t)
k=1 SELL(t) k count the
number of buys or sells between the current and the previous quotes, and represent order ow in the
market which has been shown to be informative. Finally, to capture any deterministic component
of the intra-day dynamics, we follow the commonly used approach to control for diurnality e¤ect
by including a piece-wise linear splines, DIURN into the model, to reect the time of the day that
the observation falls into.3
4 Data
Our sample consists of 64 cross-listed stocks and spans eleven months from February 1, 2011
to December 31, 2011. This sample selection constitutes all Canadian stocks listed in both the
3 see for example Dufour and Engle (2000), Engle and Patton (2004).
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Toronto Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange, which are readily tradeable in both
markets over the sample period, and are available in the database. We use tick level data from
TRTH (Thomson Reuters Tick History) database maintained by SIRCA.4 Specically, we obtain
the time stamp (to the microseconds) of bid and ask quotes, bid and ask depths, trade prices, and
trade volumes for each of the stocks in each market over the 225 trading days. For each of these
variables, we use data from the market consolidated tape to ensure that our analysis captures the
quote dynamics in the two markets accurately. In addition, we also obtain CAN/USD quotes from
TRTH, and use the midpoint to convert the Canadian quotes and trade prices into U.S. Dollar to
facilitate the specication of the error-term and ensure the comparability of prices between the two
markets.5
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE.
Table 1 presents the stocks in our sample and the summary statistics of the data over the sample
period. The average number of daily trades ranges from 44 trades (STN) to 25,616 trades (SLW)
with an average of 5,934 trades in the U.S. This gure is higher than the average daily trades in
Canada of 4,284 trades which ranges from 55 trades (NOA) to 14,496 trades (SU). In terms of
trading volume, average transaction size is lower in the U.S. than in Canada. The majority of
transactions fall in the small trade category (volume of less than 1,000 shares). A small portion of
trades comes under medium category, while big trades are extremely rare. Average daily percentage
spread is higher in the U.S. - 0.096% compared to 0.091% in Canada, of which 41 out of 64 stocks
report higher percentage spread in the U.S. than in Canada. Spread is negatively correlated with
trades; trades are relatively less (more) frequent when the spread is wide (tight), indicating the
e¤ect of liquidity on trades. For example, EQU and STN trade at the highest spread in the U.S.
Similarly, EQU and NOA have the highest spread in Canada. These stocks are some of the least
frequently traded stocks in their respective markets. Finally, if we look at the trade duration, STN
and CAE in the U.S. and NOA and MIM in Canada are the least frequently traded stocks and
have the highest average trade durations of 770, 443, 725 and 456 seconds, respectively. Apart from
4Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacic.
5We use the standing exchange rate midpoint prior to any Canadian quotes to convert the quotes into U.S. dollar.
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these stocks, most transactions occur within 60 seconds of each other with many of them trade
within less than 10 seconds.
For our analysis, we discard any transactions and quotes that occured outside trading hours between
9.35AM to 16.00PM.6 Second, high-frequency data contains a high ratio of number of quotes in a
period to the number of trades. Since a large proportion of these quotes are adjustments to the
quote depths at a particular price, and not changes in actual quote prices, we only keep a new
quote observation whenever one (or both) of the quote prices change. Third, we sometimes observe
trades executed at di¤erent prices but at the same time stamp. In such cases, we treat them as
one trade. We assign the appropriate price of the trade using value weighted average and as for
the volume, we summed the total volume of the trades, attributed it to the rst trade, and then
removed the other trades from the sample.
The challenge in using tick data from both markets is to synchronise the data. Since microsecond
data is so precise, we observe that most of the time, trading in the U.S. and Canada are conducted
at slightly di¤erent time (a fraction of a second di¤erent). Therefore, to combine the U.S. and
Canada datasets, we rst compile a series of quote time using the time stamps from both markets.
Once a combined time stamps is constructed, we link the data in each market according to the
time stamps. If there is no data for any one market at a particular time stamp, we assign zero.7
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Quote Dynamic Model
In this section, we present the results for our quote model. We estimate Equation (1) for each of the
64 stocks daily. This totals to 14,400 estimated days. The average R2(adj) statistics for the U.S.
bid and ask equations is 0.253 while for the Canadian bid and ask equations is 0.208. We report
the results in the form of the mean coe¢ cients for each stock throughout the entire sample period,
along with a percentage count of the number of times the coe¢ cient was signicantly positive and
6We omit the rst ve minutes of the trading day to ensure synchronicity of the data in both markets, since
sometimes trading in one of the markets starts later than 9:30AM. This also allows us to avoid contamination of
prices by overnight news arrival.
7Since our quote model is in rst di¤erences, adding zeros to the series will only mean that there is no change in
quotes at that particular time stamp.
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negative at 5% level. We use Whites (1980) robust standard errors in our estimations to correct
for possible heteroskedasticity.
We observe substantial evidence of increased bid and ask quotes at the beginning of the trading
day in both markets. From 9.30AM to 10AM especially, the diurnal variables show a signicant
positive coe¢ cients on the ask quotes and signicant negative coe¢ cients on the bid quotes in both
markets. The coe¢ cients of the diurnal variables decrease gradually over the subsequent time of the
day. This implies that the beginning of trading day displays a signicant deterministic component,
consistent with the literature; for example, Hasbrouck (1999) and Dufour and Engle (2000).
5.1.1 Lags of Dependent and Liquidity Variables
We report the coe¢ cients for the rst lag of the dependent variables in Panel A of Table 2.8 We
observe strong negative serial correlation between the dependent variables and their rst lags in the
home market as documented in the literature such as Stoll (2000) and Engle and Patton (2004). This
indicates that bid and ask quotes mean-revert to restore the spread to its long-run equilibrium value.
Across market, we observe reactions to changes in the lagged quotes. Specically, the coe¢ cient for
the lagged ask quote in one market on the ask dependent variable of the other market is signicantly
positive, and signicantly negative on the bid dependent variable. An increase in the ask quote
in one market leads to an increase in the ask quote and a decrease in the bid quote of the other
market in the following period. The opposite is true for the lagged bid quote. The fact that quotes
in the two markets are driven by the changes in quotes in any of the market indicates a direct link
between quotes in the two markets.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE.
With regard to the role of spreads, studies such as Jang and Venkatesh (1991) and Easley and
OHara (1992) document that a large spread leads to a fall in the ask price and a rise in the bid
price at the following quote, to restore the spread to its long-run equilibrium value. Similarly,
we expect a wide spread in one market will narrow the spread in another market to ensure the
8For brevity, we only report the rst lag. Full results are available upon request.
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competitiveness of prices in the two markets. This will be reected in a decrease in ask price and
an increase in bid price.
The empirical results in Panel B of Table 2 show the impact of the lagged spread on quotes in both
markets. A high spread in the home market leads to a decrease in the ask price and an increase
in the bid price of the same market, moving the spread toward its equilibrium value. We nd
that the coe¢ cient of the U.S. spread on the changes in U.S. ask (bid) is signicant and consistent
with the hypothesized sign in 90% (91%) of the time. The coe¢ cient of the Canadian spread on
the changes in Canadian ask (bid) is signicant and consistent with the hypothesized sign in 62%
(64%) of the time. Bid and ask quotes react to changes in spreads, indicating error-correcting
behavior of the spread. We attribute this to competition between market makers in both markets
which keeps spreads in the two markets comparable. This nding also suggests that new orders
tend to be placed within the quotes when the spread is large. Therefore, changes in spread is not
permanent but temporary, due to liqudity shocks. This is consistent with the arguments of Jang
and Venkatesh (1991) and Easley and OHara (1992), as well as the ndings of Engle and Patton
(2004).
We also observe that spreads a¤ect quotes across market the same way they a¤ect home market
quotes. Quotes in both markets react to the changes in spreads such that the spread will return
to their respective equilibriums in the following period. Particularly, an increase in spreads in the
U.S. (Canada) leads to a decrease in the ask price and an increase in the bid price in Canada
(U.S.). We conjecture this result to the competition between market makers in the two markets.
In addition, the magnitude of the Canadian spread coe¢ cients are higher on the U.S. quotes than
the U.S. spread coe¢ cients on the Canadian quotes. This is attributed to the fact that percentage
spread, on average, is higher in the U.S. than in Canada as shown in the summary statistics in
Table 2, of which 41 out of 64 stocks report higher percentage spreads in the U.S. than in Canada.
This is consistent with Jang and Venkatesh (1991) and Escribano and Pascual (2006) who suggest
that the responses of the bid and ask quotes are greater when the bid-ask spread is wide than when
the spread is narrow. Overall, our ndings suggest that quotes of cross-listed stocks are directly
driven by spreads.
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Next, we investigate the depth di¤erence as a measure of market liquidity. Depth is the log di¤erence
between the depth at the ask and the depth at the bid prices. Huang and Stoll (1994) suggest that
the di¤erence between the depth at the ask and the depth at the bid is informative. The signalling
e¤ect suggests that high depth at the ask relative to the bid indicates excess number of sellers
relative to buyers, indicating that the stock is overpriced. Furthermore, the barrier e¤ect suggests
that excess depth means less volume is required before a downward movement than an upward
movement. Both e¤ects lead to less buyers and more sellers, thus lowering the ask and increasing
the bid quotes. Similarly, we expect quotes in host market will adjust to changes in the home
market and leads to lower ask and bid quotes.
Panel C of Table 2 reports the coe¢ cients of the lagged depth di¤erence on the bid and ask quotes.
We observe that an increase in depth di¤erence in the U.S. leads to strong decrease in the home
market bid and ask quotes. For example, the coe¢ cients for DEPTH_DIFFUSt 1 are negative in
91% (91%) of the time for the U.S. ask and bid dependent variables, respectively. The same applies
to the depth di¤erence in Canada, of which the coe¢ cients are negative in 83% (84%) of the time
for the Canadian ask and bid dependent variables, respectively. This is a strong evidence for the
signalling and barrier e¤ects which lead to lower bid and ask quotes. The cross-market impact,
however, is almost negligible and unobservable. These results suggest that depth di¤erence as one
measure of liquidity only a¤ects bid and ask quotes in the home market.
5.1.2 The Importance of Trade-related Information
Another important concept in market microstructure is that trades by informed agents convey
information and therefore cause a persistent impact on the long-run value of a stock. Trade-related
activities such as direction, size, duration, and order ow are known to be informative and may
cause revisions in market quotes.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the coe¢ cients of the trade direction variables on the bid and ask quotes.
Our ndings on the impact of trade on home market bid and ask quote are consistent with the
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proposition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Huang and Stoll (1994), a buyer-initiated trade
raises both the bid and the ask quotes, while the seller-initiated trade lowers the quotes. These
quotes tend to be revised in the same direction, but not by the same amount. Ask and bid quotes
do not respond symmetrically to trade-related shocks. Buyer-initiated trades are more important
to the ask quote, while seller-initiated trades are more important to the bid quote, in either market.
Across market, however, the impacts of trade direction appears negligible with magnitudes of almost
close to zero, indicating that the two markets remain informationally fragmented.
Our empirical results reported in the Panel B of Table 3 indicate that medium trade size matters
only to a small extent.9 The coe¢ cients BUY VMED (SELLVMED) are only signicant in 11%
(11%) for the ask (bid) price in the U.S., and 16% (16%) for the ask (bid) price in Canada despite
their relatively large magnitudes. These coe¢ cients, however, have the priori expected signs: where
a BUY VMED variables all have positive signs on the bid and ask quotes while SELLVMED
all have negative signs. Panel C on Table 3 reports the coe¢ cients on the interaction between
the bid and ask quotes and the trade duration. We nd that the trade duration coe¢ cients are
insignicant in most cases. A buy transaction arriving after a long time interval has very little
impact on quotes. This is consistent with the ndings of Easley and OHara (1992), that longer
durations are likely to be associated with no news. Similarly, Engle and Patton (2004) nd that
the long duration variable tends to be insignicant, and even if they are, the coe¢ cient is usually
the opposite sign to the coe¢ cient on the trade direction variables. This nding suggests that a
trade that occurs after long duration is likely to be liquidity rather than information-driven.
Panel D on Table 3 reports our empirical ndings on the importance of order ow on the bid and
ask quotes. We nd that order ow is highly signicant in explaining informational asymmetries
in the market. We observe that TOTALBUY strongly increases both ask and bid prices in their
respective markets, while TOTALSELL strongly decreases them. This suggests that market mak-
ers set quotes based on the observations of the current and past aggregate quantities traded in
the market. We do not observe any e¤ects of trading activity across markets. Overall, all of the
above ndings suggest that trade-related information only a¤ects quotes in the home market. We
9We also conducted the analysis by adding the small size trades alongside the medium size trades. We did not
observe signicance for the small size trade variables, nor did we nd signicantly di¤erent results for the medium
size trades.
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therefore conclude that despite prices in the two markets being cointegrated, the two markets are
still informationally fragmented.
5.2 Implied Model for Spreads, Midpoint of Quotes, and Price Premium
Next, the linkage between quote revisions and liquidity shocks and trade-related information are
assessed using the quote model in the previous section. Based on this model, we can derive an
implied VAR model for various market microstructure variables such as the spread in each market,
mid-quote between markets, as well as the cross-market di¤erence in mid-quotes. The impact
of trades on the spread is of particular interest as the spread represents a key measure of the
magnitude of friction in the market. The impact of liquidity and trades on the mid-quote between
markets is also important as the mid-quote represents the implied e¢ cient price of the cross-listed
stock. Particularly, we are able to test whether the long-term value of the stock varies according
to buyer and seller-initiatied trades, as well as liquidity shocks. Finally, the cross-market di¤erence
in midquotes represents the relative premium of trading in one market over another.
Equation (1) is rotated and restructured into a more desirable form of the log spread in each
market, SPREADAt j and SPREAD
B
t j ; the log di¤erence in the mid-quote from both markets,
 log(MQt j); and the cross-market di¤erence in log mid-quotes, log(MQA Bt j ) as specied below.
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266666664
SPREADAt
SPREADBt
log(MQt)
log(MQA Bt )
377777775
=ec+ 10X
j=1
eA(j) 
0BBBBBBB@
T1 
266666664
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SPREADBt j
log(MQt j)
log(MQA Bt j )
377777775
  T2 
266666664
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log(MQt (j+1))
log(MQA Bt (j+1))
377777775
1CCCCCCCA
+

K + eB  T3 
266666664
SPREADAt 1
SPREADBt 1
log(MQt 1)
log(MQA Bt 1 )
377777775
+e 1
24 DEPTH_DIFFAt 1
DEPTH_DIFFBt 1
35
+
3X
k=1
e (k)2 
266666666666664
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(t) k  1
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(t) k
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(t) k DA(t) k
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(t) k  1
BUY B(t) k  V B;med(t) k
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(t) k DB(t) k
377777777777775
+
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k=1
e (k)3 
266666666666664
SELLA(t) k  1
SELLA(t) k  V A;med(t) k
SELLA(t) k DA(t) k
SELLB(t) k  1
SELLB(t) k  V B;med(t) k
SELLB(t) k DB(t) k
377777777777775
+e 4
266666664
Pl(t)
k=1BUY
A
(t) kPl(t)
k=1 SELL
A
(t) kPl(t)
k=1BUY
B
(t) kPl(t)
k=1 SELL
B
(t) k
377777775
+
7X
d=1
e (d)5  hDIURNdt i+e"t: (2)
where T1; T2; and T3 are rotation matrices. The derivation of this model can be found in Appendix
(A.2).
The coe¢ cients for our implied model are obtained through linear combination of the parameters
estimated in Equation (1), while the standard errors are obtained by applying the same rotation
steps to the residuals and variance-covariance matrix of the same equation. We report the results
in the form of the mean coe¢ cient for each stock throughout the entire sample period, along with
a percentage count of the number of times the coe¢ cient was signicantly positive and negative at
5% level. We use Whites (1980) robust standard errors in our estimations to correct for possible
heteroskedasticity. Consistent with the nding in the previous section, we nd that spreads in both
markets are higher at the beginning of the day compared to the other periods. We nd no evidence
of an increase in average spreads towards the end of the day.
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5.2.1 Lags of Dependent and Liquidity Variables
We rst assess whether the implied variables such as the spreads, midpoint returns, and price
premium are persistent. We also assess whether these variables are a¤ected by liquidity variables
such as the bid-ask spread and depth di¤erence. We report the results in Table 4.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE.
The change in midpoint shows persistence as reported in Panel A of Table 4. Past returns in
midpoint predict subsequent midpoint returns, indicating positive correlation in prices. Huang and
Stoll (1994) explain that the ability to predict returns on the basis of microstructure variables is not
necessarily inconsistent with an e¢ cient market. Institutional constraints such as the di¢ culty to
continuously adjusting limit orders to information contained in prices may explain such predictive
power. The negative coe¢ cient on the price premium suggests that positive return in midpoint
price leads to a greater increase in Canadian prices compared to U.S. prices, thus a decrease in
price premium. The price premium appears to be persistent especially for the rst lag with highly
positive and signicant coe¢ cients. This nding suggests a positive premium in the U.S. tends to
be positively and serially correlated. The price premium also has a positive and signicant impact
on the price midpoint. An increase in premium suggests the midquote in the U.S. increases more
than the midquote in Canada, leading to an increase in overall price midpoint. We do not observe
any impact of price premium on the spreads in any of the two markets.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the coe¢ cients of the bid-ask spreads on the implied model. The
spreads do not seem to have signicant impact on price midpoint and premium. They do, however,
a¤ect the spreads in the subsequent period, both in the home market, as well as across market.
SPREADUSt 1 leads to a decrease in Canadian spread in the following period while SPREADCANt 1
leads to a decrease in the U.S. spread in the following period. Since high spread leads to a decrease
in the ask and an increase in the bid, it will move the spread toward its equilibrium value. Therefore,
it is expected that the coe¢ cients for SPREADt 1 to be negative for the spread equations of the
other market.
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Panel C of Table 4 reports the coe¢ cients of the lagged depth di¤erence on the implied model.
We do not observe any impact of the depth di¤erence on spreads. However, the impact on price
midpoint is negative and highly signicant. Both DEPTH_DIFFUSt 1 and DEPTH_DIFFCANt 1
report strong negative coe¢ cients on the price midpoint. This, again, is consistent with the sig-
nalling and barrier e¤ects discussed in the previous section. The result can therefore be interpreted
as large depth di¤erence indicates oversupply of assets traded, thus suggesting that the stock
is overpriced, leading to less buying and more selling by investors, hence both the ask and bid
prices will decrease. Therefore, when the depth di¤erence either in the U.S. or in Canada is large,
the midpoint tend to be lower. The impact on the price premium is negative and signicant for
DEPTH_DIFFUSt 1 and positive and signicant for DEPTH_DIFFCANt 1 . This is consistent with
the results in Section (5.1.1), because DEPTH_DIFFUSt 1 lowers only the U.S. bid and ask prices
and not Canadian bid and ask prices, thus lowering the di¤erence in prices in the two markets.
DEPTH_DIFFCANt 1 on the other hand, lowers Canadian bid and ask prices, and not the U.S.
quotes. As a consequence, the di¤erence in prices in the two markets increases. In terms of mag-
nitude, the impact of U.S. depth di¤erence is greater (in absolute terms) on the price midpoint
and price premium, compared to the impact of Canada depth di¤erence, indicating asymmetric
reactions by investors the two markets.
5.2.2 The Importance of Trade-related Information
Finally, we examine the importance of trade-related information on the implied variables of spreads,
midpoint returns, and price premium. Panel A in Table 5 shows that trade direction has very little
impact on spreads. We observe positive relationship between buyer and seller-initiated trades and
the bid-ask spread in the U.S. However, the positive coe¢ cients are only signicant 19% of the
time. While the asymmetric impacts of buys and sells on the ask and bid quotes are apparent as
shown in Section (5.1.2), it is not easily detectable in a model for the spread. We observe similar
relationship between trades and spread in Canada, in which the coe¢ cients are positive, but they
are not statistically signicant. We do not observe a noticable impact of trades on spreads across
market.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE.
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In terms of the implied e¢ cient price, both an increase in purchases in the U.S. and Canada lead to
an increase in the midpoint, whereas an increase in sells from either market will lead to a decrease.
This is consistent with the ndings in Panel A of Table 3 because both ask and bid prices increase
following a purchase and decrease following a sell. Engle and Patton (2004) argue as trade increases
the uncertainty about the true price of the stock, leading to not only the bid and ask prices to
increase, but also the mid-quote to rise. As for the price premium, purchases in the U.S. lead to an
increase in the price premium, while sells in the U.S. lead to a decrease in premium. The opposite
is true for trades in Canada. In terms of magnitude, larger coe¢ cients for the U.S. trades compared
to Canadian trades on midpoint and premium indicate strong evidence of information asymmetry
between the two markets.
Our empirical results, Panel B of Table 5, indicate that medium-sized trades do not a¤ect spreads
in either market. They do, whoever, to a small extent a¤ect price midpoint and price premium.
For the price midpoint, the coe¢ cients BUY VMED (SELLVMED) are signicant 19% (19%) of
time in the U.S., and 26% (25%) in Canada. For the price premium, the coe¢ cients BUY VMED
(SELLVMED) are signicant in 18% (18%) in the U.S., and 24% (24%) in Canada. As for trade
duration, results reported in Panel C on Table 5 shows that trade duration coe¢ cients are small
and almost negligible in most cases.
The impact of order ow is highly apparent, as shown in Panel D of Table 5, particularly on the
price midpoint and price premium. On the midpoint, TOTALBUY from both markets strongly
increase the midpoint of prices between the two markets. TOTALSELL strongly lowers the price
midpoint. This is clear evidence of the importance of order ow on the revisions of the e¢ cient
price of the cross-listed stocks which is in line with the study of Kyle (1985). As for the market
premium, and increase in TOTALBUY US increase the price premium even further. Expectedly,
TOTALSELLUS lowers the price premium as the price of the stock in the U.S. decreases. Inversely,
TOTALBUY CAN lowers the premium, while TOTALSELLCAN further increases the price pre-
mium between markets.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the dynamics of quotes for cross-listed stocks. We specify a model to
represent the quote revisions in each market and use as regressors a variety of liquidity and trade-
related variables commonly used in the literature. From the empirical perspective, this paper
represents an extension of the VECM model introduced by Engle and Patton (2004). We jointly
model the time series dynamics of the revisions of bid and ask quotes for two fully-synchronised
markets, thus providing a general model to assess quote dynamics in multiple markets. Another
feature of this model is it enables us to extract the implied model for several microstructure variables
such as the bid-ask spreads, the midpoint of prices between markets, and the price premium, in a
VAR framework.
Application of our model using data from Canadian cross-listed stocks in the U.S. leads to several
interesting ndings. First, quote dynamics in the two markets are driven by liquidity shocks
measured by the bid-ask spread. Changes in spread in one market is likely to cause adjustments in
quotes in another market. This is a strong evidence of the the error-correcting mechanism of the
spread on quotes. Second, the di¤erence in depth is only informative in the home market, indicating
that the only form of liquidity a¤ecting quotes across market is the spread. Third, trade-related
information, are shown to have a direct e¤ect on quotes in the home market, but not across market.
This observation indicates that even though prices in the two markets are cointegrated, the markets
are still informationally segmented. Fourth, we nd that liquidity and trade-related information
play a greater role in the U.S than in Canada. Furthermore, U.S. trades have greater impact on
the midpoint (implied e¢ cient price) and the di¤erence in midquotes than trades in Canada.
The above ndings describe the mechanism of how liquidity and trade-related information get
incorporated into prices for cross-listed stocks through the impact they have on quotes. We show
how quote dynamics in two markets are driven by liquidity. The prominence of the impact of bid
and ask spread on quotes suggests that liquidity is an important direct channel of information in
multiple markets. We also show that the fundamentals of cross-listed stocks such as the e¢ cient
price and relative premium are not only driven by liquidity shocks, but also buyer and seller-initiated
trades, from any of the two markets. These results suggest that both liquidity and trade-related
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information provide investors with valuable information source on the fundamental values of cross-
listed stocks.
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8 Appendix
Appendix A.1. Description of Variables
Variable Description
Quote variables
log(ASKit) The log di¤erence in ask price in market i between quote t and quote t  1.
log(BIDit) The log di¤erence in bid price in market i between quote t and quote t  1.
SPREADit The log spread in market i: log(ASK
i
t)  log(BIDit).
DEPTH_DIFF it The log di¤erence between the depth at the ask and bid prices in market i at quote t.
 log(MQt) The log di¤erence in average midquote from all markets, between quote t and quote t  1.
log(MQA Bt ) The di¤erence in log midquotes between market A and market B, at quote t.
Trade-related variables
l(t) The number of trades between quote t and quote t  1.
(t)  k Denotes the kth most recent trade at quote t.
BUY i
(t) k Buy indicator in market i: returns 1 if l(t)  k and the kth most recent trade at quote t
was identied as a buy, else returns 0.
SELLi
(t) k Sell indicator in market i: returns 1 if l(t)  k and the kth most recent trade at quote t
was identied as a sell, else returns 0.
V i;med
(t) k Medium volume trade indicator in market i: returns 1 if the kth most recent trade at quote t
had volume between 1,000 and 10,000 shares, else returns 0.
Di
(t) k The duration in market i of the kth most recent trade at quote t: (in seconds)
Deterministic variables
DIURNdt Diurnal adjustment variable: the value of the dth diurnal indicator variable at quote t.
Market Innovations
"t The vector of market innovation at quote t.
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Appendix A.2. Derivation of The Implied Model
Consider the simplied form of the quote model:
Yt = c+
10X
j=1
A(j) Yt j +B  spreadt 1 +
5X
=1
  Xt 1 + "t; (A1)
where Yt =
266666664
log(ASKAt )
 log(BIDAt )
 log(ASKBt )
 log(BIDBt )
377777775
; spreadt 1 =
24 SPREADAt 1
SPREADBt 1
35; Xt 1 and   represent other variables
and their coe¢ cients. We multiply each of the variables in Equation (A1) with a rotation matrix,
T =
266666664
1  1 0 0
0 0 1  1
0:25 0:25 0:25 0:25
0:5 0:5  0:5  0:5
377777775
, such that eYt= T Yt =
266666664
SPREADAt
SPREADBt
log(MQt)
 log(MQA Bt )
377777775
; and obtain the following:
eYt = ec+ 10X
j=1
eA(j) Yt j + eB  spreadt 1 + 5X
=1
e  Xt 1 + e"t: (A2)
From Equation (A2), we can further restructure the expression into a more desirable model of
the log spread in each market, SPRAt and SPR
B
t , the log di¤erence in the mid-quote from both
markets,  log(MQt), and the cross-market di¤erence in log mid-quotes, log(MQA Bt ).
Given eZt=
266666664
SPREADAt
SPREADBt
log(MQt)
log(MQA Bt )
377777775
; T1=
266666664
0:5 0 1 0:5
 0:5 0 1 0:5
0 0:5 1  0:5
0  0:5 1  0:5
377777775
; T2=
266666664
0:5 0 0 0:5
 0:5 0 0 0:5
0 0:5 0  0:5
0  0:5 0  0:5
377777775
; T3=
24 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
35 ;
and K =
266666664
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
377777775
, we can write the following expressions:
eYt = eZt   (K  eZt 1) (A3)
Yt j = T1  eZt j   T2  eZt (j+1) (A4)
spreadt 1 = T3  eZt 1 (A5)
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Using the espressions in Equation (A3) - (A5), we can therefore rewrite Equation (A2) as:
eZt K  eZt 1 = ec+ 10X
j=1
eA(j) T1  eZt j   T2  eZt (j+1)+ eB T3  eZt 1+ 5X
=1
e  Xt 1+e"t: (A6)
Rearranging Equation (A6) we arrive at the nal model:
eZt = ec+ 10X
j=2
eA(j)  T1  eZt j   T2  eZt (j+1)+ K + eB  T3  eZt 1 + 5X
=1
e  Xt 1 + e"t: (A7a)
Writing Equation (A7a) out, we get:
266666664
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log(MQA Bt )
377777775
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log(MQA Bt (j+1))
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1CCCCCCCA
+
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SPREADBt 1
log(MQt 1)
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+e 1
24 DEPTH_DIFFAt 1
DEPTH_DIFFBt 1
35
+
3X
k=1
e (k)2 
266666666666664
BUY A(t) k  1
BUY A(t) k  V A;med(t) k
BUY A(t) k DA(t) k
BUY B(t) k  1
BUY B(t) k  V B;med(t) k
BUY B(t) k DB(t) k
377777777777775
+
3X
k=1
e (k)3 
266666666666664
SELLA(t) k  1
SELLA(t) k  V A;med(t) k
SELLA(t) k DA(t) k
SELLB(t) k  1
SELLB(t) k  V B;med(t) k
SELLB(t) k DB(t) k
377777777777775
+e 4
266666664
Pl(t)
k=1BUY
A
(t) kPl(t)
k=1 SELL
A
(t) kPl(t)
k=1BUY
B
(t) kPl(t)
k=1 SELL
B
(t) k
377777775
+
7X
d=1
e (d)5  hDIURNdt i+e"t: (A7b)
28
T
ab
le
1.
S
u
m
m
ar
y
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
T
ab
le
1
re
p
or
ts
th
e
su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
tr
ad
es
in
th
e
U
.S
.
an
d
C
an
ad
a
fo
r
64
st
oc
ks
in
th
e
sa
m
p
le
.
T
h
e

gu
re
s
ar
e
co
m
p
u
te
d
ov
er
22
5
tr
ad
in
g
d
ay
s
fr
om
F
eb
ru
ar
y
1,
20
11
to
D
ec
em
b
er
31
,
20
11
.
T
h
e

rs
t
tw
o
co
lu
m
n
s
re
p
or
t
th
e
ti
ck
er
sy
m
b
ol
s
in
th
e
U
.S
.
an
d
th
e
co
m
p
an
y
n
am
es
.
N
d
en
ot
es
th
e
av
er
ag
e
d
ai
ly
nu
m
b
er
of
tr
ad
es
,
V
ol
u
m
e
d
en
ot
es
th
e
av
er
ag
e
d
ai
ly
tr
ad
in
g
vo
lu
m
e,
S
m
l,
M
ed
,
an
d
B
ig
ar
e
tr
ad
e
in
d
ic
at
or
s
w
h
ic
h
co
u
nt
th
e
nu
m
b
er
of
tr
ad
es
w
it
h
a
vo
lu
m
e
of
le
ss
th
an
1,
00
0
sh
ar
es
,
b
et
w
ee
n
1,
00
0
an
d
10
,0
00
sh
ar
es
,
an
d
ov
er
10
,0
00
sh
ar
es
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
%
S
pr
ea
d
d
en
ot
es
th
e
p
er
ce
nt
ag
e
d
i¤
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
lo
g
as
k
an
d
lo
g
b
id
qu
ot
es
.
D
u
ra
ti
on
is
th
e
av
er
ag
e
ti
m
e
ta
ke
n
b
et
w
ee
n
tw
o
co
n
se
cu
ti
ve
tr
ad
es
,
m
ea
su
re
d
in
se
co
n
d
s.
U
S
C
A
N
S
y
m
b
o
l
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
N
a
m
e
N
V
o
lu
m
e
S
m
l
M
e
d
B
ig
%
S
p
re
a
d
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
N
V
o
lu
m
e
S
m
l
M
e
d
B
ig
%
S
p
re
a
d
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
A
A
V
A
d
v
a
n
ta
g
e
O
il
a
n
d
G
a
s
L
td
.
1
,2
1
4
3
0
2
1
,1
5
9
5
5
0
0
.1
9
3
%
2
2
.8
1
,4
4
4
7
1
7
1
,3
0
8
1
3
1
5
0
.1
6
1
%
1
9
.1
A
B
X
B
a
rr
ic
k
G
o
ld
2
2
,6
9
5
2
9
9
2
1
,8
0
7
8
8
1
7
0
.0
2
2
%
1
.1
1
0
,7
8
2
2
9
5
1
0
,4
4
0
3
3
8
3
0
.0
2
4
%
2
.4
A
E
M
A
g
n
ic
o
-E
a
g
le
M
in
es
L
im
it
ed
7
,3
2
6
2
1
1
7
,2
1
1
1
1
4
1
0
.0
5
4
%
3
.7
2
,8
4
4
1
9
8
2
,8
1
6
2
8
1
0
.0
5
1
%
9
.4
A
G
F
ir
st
M
a
je
st
ic
S
il
v
er
C
o
rp
.
3
,7
1
2
3
0
8
3
,5
6
9
1
4
3
0
0
.1
2
8
%
9
.1
3
,2
1
0
2
9
7
3
,1
0
7
1
0
2
1
0
.1
0
2
%
8
.7
A
G
U
A
g
ri
u
m
In
c.
6
,0
4
0
1
8
8
5
,9
8
7
5
3
0
0
.0
6
0
%
4
.4
2
,8
4
8
1
9
8
2
,8
2
7
2
1
1
0
.0
5
1
%
9
.2
A
T
A
tl
a
n
ti
c
P
o
w
er
C
o
rp
.
1
,1
2
5
2
7
1
1
,0
8
6
3
9
0
0
.1
1
5
%
2
9
.8
6
9
7
2
6
1
6
7
4
2
3
0
0
.0
8
9
%
4
8
.6
A
U
Y
Y
a
m
a
n
a
G
o
ld
In
c.
1
6
,2
9
7
5
3
9
1
4
,3
6
6
1
9
1
4
1
7
0
.0
6
7
%
1
.7
6
,6
3
6
7
1
5
5
,6
9
4
9
3
0
1
2
0
.0
7
1
%
3
.9
B
A
M
B
ro
o
k

el
d
A
ss
et
M
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
In
c.
3
,8
7
2
2
1
7
3
,8
1
0
6
1
1
0
.0
4
8
%
7
.0
3
,2
5
9
2
6
8
3
,2
0
8
4
9
2
0
.0
4
1
%
7
.9
B
C
E
B
C
E
In
c.
2
,4
5
7
2
1
1
2
,4
2
1
3
7
0
0
.0
3
9
%
1
0
.7
5
,6
8
8
3
4
1
5
,4
5
4
2
3
1
4
0
.0
2
7
%
4
.4
B
M
O
B
a
n
k
o
f
M
o
n
tr
ea
l
3
,4
3
4
2
1
1
3
,3
8
9
4
4
1
0
.0
2
8
%
8
.3
6
,9
0
1
2
5
7
6
,7
4
8
1
5
1
3
0
.0
2
0
%
3
.7
B
N
S
B
a
n
k
o
f
N
o
v
a
S
co
ti
a
2
,0
8
1
1
7
8
2
,0
6
7
1
4
0
0
.0
4
2
%
1
4
.6
8
,2
5
4
2
8
6
8
,0
4
6
2
0
4
4
0
.0
2
2
%
3
.1
B
P
O
B
ro
o
k

el
d
O
¢
ce
6
,1
3
6
3
2
0
5
,8
5
4
2
7
8
4
0
.0
5
8
%
4
.4
2
,1
2
5
3
8
6
2
,0
2
5
9
7
2
0
.0
5
9
%
1
2
.8
B
T
E
B
a
y
te
x
E
n
er
g
y
C
o
rp
.
1
,1
4
0
1
7
7
1
,1
3
1
8
0
0
.1
0
0
%
2
5
.6
1
,4
3
5
2
1
5
1
,4
1
8
1
5
1
0
.0
7
7
%
1
9
.9
C
A
E
C
A
E
In
c.
6
9
2
3
1
6
8
1
0
0
.2
1
7
%
4
4
3
.0
1
,4
0
3
4
9
3
1
,3
4
1
5
9
3
0
.0
9
2
%
1
8
.4
C
C
J
C
a
m
ec
o
C
o
rp
.
9
,3
2
6
2
6
4
9
,0
2
5
2
9
9
2
0
.0
4
9
%
3
.1
5
,7
6
0
2
8
3
5
,6
0
9
1
4
8
3
0
.0
4
5
%
4
.8
C
L
S
C
el
es
ti
ca
In
c.
2
,5
9
8
2
5
4
2
,5
1
4
8
3
0
0
.1
2
1
%
1
1
.4
1
,4
8
5
6
6
2
1
,3
8
9
9
3
3
0
.1
1
0
%
1
9
.3
C
M
C
a
n
a
d
ia
n
Im
p
er
ia
l
B
a
n
k
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
1
,1
5
9
1
5
5
1
,1
5
4
5
0
0
.0
5
5
%
2
5
.3
4
,6
0
2
2
2
7
4
,5
3
2
6
8
2
0
.0
2
7
%
5
.6
C
N
I
C
a
n
a
d
ia
n
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
R
a
il
w
a
y
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
4
,0
4
3
1
6
4
4
,0
2
3
2
0
0
0
.0
4
3
%
6
.6
3
,6
9
5
1
9
1
3
,6
6
7
2
7
1
0
.0
3
2
%
6
.9
C
N
Q
C
a
n
a
d
ia
n
N
a
tu
ra
l
R
es
o
u
rc
es
L
td
.
1
2
,5
0
0
2
3
2
1
2
,2
6
3
2
3
5
2
0
.0
3
1
%
2
.1
1
0
,3
6
4
3
1
1
9
,9
7
5
3
8
4
4
0
.0
2
9
%
2
.5
C
O
T
C
O
T
T
C
o
rp
.
1
,6
8
4
2
9
6
1
,6
2
5
5
7
2
0
.1
5
9
%
1
7
.9
3
6
4
4
6
1
3
5
5
8
0
0
.1
5
9
%
9
9
.7
C
P
C
a
n
a
d
ia
n
P
a
ci

c
3
,9
4
3
1
6
7
3
,9
1
6
2
6
1
0
.0
4
7
%
8
.4
2
,7
8
3
1
9
7
2
,7
5
9
2
2
1
0
.0
3
9
%
1
0
.1
C
V
E
C
en
ev
o
u
s
E
n
er
g
y
In
c.
5
,4
4
0
2
1
0
5
,3
6
6
7
3
1
0
.0
4
7
%
4
.8
6
,9
2
3
2
6
9
6
,7
7
7
1
4
2
4
0
.0
3
6
%
3
.7
E
C
A
E
n
ca
n
a
C
o
rp
.
1
3
,2
9
8
2
9
4
1
2
,7
6
1
5
3
4
3
0
.0
3
8
%
2
.0
7
,9
2
3
3
7
5
7
,4
9
6
4
2
2
5
0
.0
3
8
%
3
.2
E
G
O
E
ld
o
ra
d
o
G
o
ld
C
o
rp
.
1
0
,4
6
6
3
3
1
9
,8
7
4
5
9
0
2
0
.0
5
7
%
2
.4
6
,2
7
1
4
7
9
5
,7
6
6
4
9
9
6
0
.0
5
7
%
4
.1
E
N
B
E
n
b
ri
d
g
e
In
c.
2
,1
6
1
1
8
1
2
,1
4
0
2
1
0
0
.0
4
9
%
1
3
.7
4
,6
8
2
2
7
5
4
,6
0
3
7
6
3
0
.0
3
2
%
6
.0
E
Q
U
E
q
u
a
l
E
n
er
g
y
L
td
.
2
1
5
3
3
8
2
0
3
1
2
0
0
.5
9
1
%
1
6
0
.8
9
6
4
6
1
8
9
7
0
0
.6
8
7
%
3
9
2
.3
E
R
F
E
n
er
p
lu
s
C
o
rp
.
2
,9
3
2
2
4
0
2
,8
7
2
6
0
0
0
.0
6
5
%
9
.5
2
,1
6
5
2
0
3
2
,1
4
2
2
2
0
0
.0
5
1
%
1
2
.6
E
X
K
E
n
d
ea
v
o
u
r
S
il
v
er
C
o
rp
.
6
,2
5
7
3
9
2
5
,8
3
6
4
1
8
3
0
.1
1
5
%
4
.4
1
,6
8
6
3
3
4
1
,6
0
6
7
9
0
0
.1
2
3
%
1
9
.4
G
G
G
o
ld
co
rp
In
c.
1
9
,3
5
7
2
7
0
1
8
,7
9
6
5
5
4
6
0
.0
2
4
%
1
.3
9
,9
8
9
2
6
9
9
,7
1
3
2
7
4
2
0
.0
2
5
%
2
.5
G
IB
C
G
I
G
ro
u
p
9
0
1
1
9
0
8
9
3
8
0
0
.0
8
6
%
3
0
.1
1
,9
5
9
4
3
8
1
,8
9
9
5
5
5
0
.0
5
7
%
1
4
.5
G
IL
G
il
d
a
n
A
ct
iv
ew
ea
r
In
c.
2
,2
5
0
1
8
3
2
,2
2
7
2
2
0
0
.0
7
3
%
1
3
.0
1
,9
1
4
2
4
4
1
,8
8
7
2
5
2
0
.0
5
9
%
1
5
.4
H
B
M
H
u
d
b
a
y
M
in
er
a
ls
In
c.
9
7
2
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
.2
3
7
%
3
5
6
.5
1
,7
7
6
4
4
2
1
,6
8
6
8
6
3
0
.0
9
6
%
1
5
.0
IA
G
IA
M
G
O
L
D
C
o
rp
.
8
,4
4
0
2
6
1
8
,1
8
0
2
6
0
1
0
.0
5
2
%
3
.1
5
,1
9
3
3
4
7
4
,9
8
6
2
0
4
4
0
.0
5
2
%
5
.1
K
G
C
K
in
ro
ss
G
o
ld
C
o
rp
.
1
5
,8
6
0
4
6
0
1
4
,2
4
9
1
6
0
2
9
0
.0
6
0
%
1
.6
8
,5
5
1
7
8
7
7
,1
8
4
1
,3
4
7
1
9
0
.0
6
2
%
2
.9
M
F
C
M
a
n
u
li
fe
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
C
o
rp
.
8
,4
1
1
3
4
6
7
,9
0
1
5
0
8
2
0
.0
6
3
%
3
.2
8
,5
5
5
8
6
8
6
,9
2
1
1
,6
0
9
2
5
0
.0
6
7
%
3
.0
M
G
A
M
a
g
n
a
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
In
c.
4
,7
7
8
1
8
9
4
,7
3
5
4
3
1
0
.0
6
0
%
5
.8
3
,2
0
0
2
1
4
3
,1
6
2
3
7
2
0
.0
5
0
%
8
.4
M
IM
M
I
D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
ts
In
c.
4
7
0
2
5
4
4
6
3
7
1
0
.1
7
5
%
8
1
.8
1
1
3
9
5
4
1
1
0
2
1
0
.2
3
6
%
4
5
6
.4
N
D
Z
N
o
rd
io
n
In
c.
5
6
2
2
2
5
5
5
2
9
0
0
.1
8
5
%
5
3
.7
1
5
3
3
7
3
1
5
0
2
0
0
.2
2
2
%
2
2
9
.3
29
T
ab
le
1.
C
on
ti
n
u
ed
U
S
C
A
N
S
y
m
b
o
l
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
N
a
m
e
N
V
o
lu
m
e
S
m
l
M
e
d
B
ig
%
S
p
re
a
d
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
N
V
o
lu
m
e
S
m
l
M
e
d
B
ig
%
S
p
re
a
d
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
N
O
A
N
o
rt
h
A
m
er
ic
a
n
E
n
er
g
y
P
a
rt
n
er
s
In
c.
8
3
1
2
4
1
8
1
0
2
1
1
0
.3
7
1
%
4
9
.3
5
5
2
2
6
5
4
1
0
0
.7
5
4
%
7
2
5
.0
N
X
Y
N
ex
en
In
c.
1
0
,3
5
2
2
9
0
9
,9
3
0
4
1
8
3
0
.0
4
9
%
2
.5
5
,5
6
0
3
8
8
5
,2
5
9
2
9
8
3
0
.0
4
9
%
4
.7
P
D
S
P
re
ci
si
o
n
D
ri
ll
in
g
T
ru
st
5
,7
7
8
3
0
1
5
,5
3
1
2
4
6
2
0
.0
8
5
%
4
.8
3
,7
2
0
5
9
9
3
,4
2
8
2
8
5
7
0
.0
8
5
%
7
.6
P
G
H
P
en
g
ro
w
th
E
n
er
g
y
C
o
rp
.
2
,8
3
2
3
5
3
2
,6
5
9
1
7
1
1
0
.0
9
3
%
9
.1
2
,0
8
6
4
9
6
1
,9
0
4
1
7
9
3
0
.0
8
6
%
1
2
.3
P
O
T
P
o
ta
sh
C
o
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
o
f
S
a
sk
a
tc
h
ew
a
n
In
c.
2
3
,1
8
0
2
7
7
2
2
,4
7
4
7
0
0
6
0
.0
2
9
%
1
.1
7
,8
3
6
2
3
7
7
,6
8
5
1
5
0
1
0
.0
2
8
%
3
.5
P
W
E
P
en
n
W
es
t
P
et
ro
le
u
m
L
td
.
6
,5
5
8
2
7
2
6
,3
3
5
2
2
2
1
0
.0
5
0
%
4
.0
4
,1
5
6
3
4
2
3
,9
8
6
1
6
7
3
0
.0
4
8
%
6
.2
R
B
A
R
it
ch
ie
B
ro
th
er
s
A
u
ct
io
n
ee
rs
1
,6
1
9
2
1
3
1
,5
9
9
1
9
1
0
.1
0
2
%
1
8
.3
2
8
8
1
9
2
2
8
5
2
0
0
.1
3
7
%
1
1
5
.0
R
C
I
R
o
g
er
s
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
In
c.
1
,7
0
1
1
8
0
1
,6
8
9
1
2
0
0
.0
5
1
%
1
6
.0
4
,7
6
7
3
2
4
4
,6
1
3
1
4
9
5
0
.0
3
2
%
5
.3
R
Y
R
o
y
a
l
B
a
n
k
o
f
C
a
n
a
d
a
3
,0
0
3
2
1
8
2
,9
5
4
4
9
0
0
.0
3
6
%
9
.9
1
1
,4
9
7
3
3
8
1
1
,0
5
5
4
3
5
7
0
.0
2
0
%
2
.2
S
A
S
ea
b
ri
d
g
e
G
o
ld
In
c.
1
,0
9
7
1
9
9
1
,0
8
2
1
4
0
0
.2
4
1
%
2
5
.4
8
4
1
6
5
8
3
0
0
0
.3
4
3
%
3
8
8
.2
S
J
R
S
h
a
w
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
s
In
c.
6
3
4
1
7
4
6
3
0
5
0
0
.0
7
5
%
4
8
.5
2
,8
9
1
3
4
7
2
,8
0
0
8
9
3
0
.0
5
0
%
8
.6
S
L
F
S
u
n
L
if
e
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
2
,3
6
2
2
1
2
2
,3
2
1
4
1
0
0
.0
5
7
%
1
2
.0
5
,6
3
3
3
5
2
5
,4
3
5
1
9
3
4
0
.0
3
9
%
4
.6
S
L
W
S
il
v
er
W
h
ea
to
n
C
o
rp
.
2
5
,6
1
6
3
2
4
2
4
,3
8
4
1
2
2
3
9
0
.0
3
2
%
1
.1
6
,5
1
8
2
9
6
6
,3
1
9
1
9
7
2
0
.0
3
7
%
4
.0
S
T
N
S
ta
n
te
c
In
c.
4
4
1
5
0
4
4
0
0
0
.4
0
7
%
7
7
0
.0
2
7
1
4
8
6
2
6
6
4
1
0
.2
0
1
%
1
0
6
.3
S
U
S
u
n
co
r
E
n
er
g
y
In
co
rp
o
ra
te
d
2
1
,6
0
0
2
9
5
2
0
,7
9
4
8
0
2
4
0
.0
2
8
%
1
.2
1
4
,4
9
6
4
2
5
1
3
,4
2
5
1
,0
6
4
8
0
.0
2
9
%
1
.8
S
V
M
S
il
v
er
co
rp
M
et
a
ls
In
c.
8
,5
6
6
3
9
5
7
,8
8
6
6
7
5
6
0
.1
0
6
%
3
.4
2
,8
7
9
4
2
3
2
,6
1
3
2
6
4
1
0
.1
0
8
%
9
.8
T
A
C
T
ra
n
sA
lt
a
C
o
rp
.
1
4
3
2
0
9
1
4
1
2
0
0
.1
1
5
%
2
0
8
.8
2
,0
8
6
3
1
3
2
,0
1
5
7
1
1
0
.0
5
0
%
1
2
.2
T
C
T
h
o
m
p
so
n
C
re
ek
M
et
a
ls
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
In
c.
5
,9
3
4
3
4
6
5
,5
6
9
3
6
3
2
0
.1
1
0
%
4
.5
2
,1
4
2
4
7
5
1
,9
6
4
1
7
6
3
0
.1
1
0
%
1
2
.6
T
C
K
T
ec
k
R
es
o
u
rc
es
L
td
.
1
3
,4
3
6
2
2
9
1
3
,2
0
7
2
2
8
2
0
.0
3
5
%
2
.0
9
,1
9
6
2
8
9
8
,9
0
9
2
8
4
3
0
.0
3
3
%
2
.9
T
D
T
o
ro
n
to
-D
o
m
in
io
n
B
a
n
k
2
,9
4
3
1
8
2
2
,9
1
9
2
3
0
0
.0
4
0
%
9
.4
7
,3
8
5
2
3
6
7
,2
6
3
1
1
9
2
0
.0
2
1
%
3
.5
T
H
I
T
im
H
o
rt
o
n
s
In
c.
1
,0
4
1
1
5
5
1
,0
3
8
3
0
0
.0
6
7
%
2
7
.0
1
,7
0
7
2
2
4
1
,6
9
4
1
3
1
0
.0
5
1
%
1
4
.8
T
L
M
T
a
li
sm
a
n
E
n
er
g
y
In
c.
1
0
,9
6
9
3
2
5
1
0
,3
9
7
5
6
9
3
0
.0
5
2
%
2
.4
7
,5
6
8
5
2
2
6
,8
4
5
7
1
4
9
0
.0
5
6
%
3
.4
T
R
I
T
h
o
m
so
n
R
eu
te
rs
C
o
rp
.
3
,6
3
8
2
0
2
3
,5
8
9
4
9
0
0
.0
4
3
%
7
.7
3
,7
6
8
3
3
1
3
,6
7
5
8
9
3
0
.0
3
3
%
6
.7
T
R
P
T
ra
n
sC
a
n
a
d
a
C
o
rp
.
2
,3
4
8
1
9
4
2
,3
2
3
2
5
0
0
.0
4
4
%
1
2
.7
5
,7
4
0
3
1
7
5
,5
9
7
1
3
8
5
0
.0
2
7
%
4
.6
T
U
T
el
u
s
C
o
rp
4
8
1
1
5
0
4
7
9
2
0
0
.0
9
3
%
6
6
.3
2
,1
3
4
2
3
1
2
,1
1
3
2
0
2
0
.0
3
9
%
1
1
.9
V
R
X
V
a
le
a
n
t
P
h
a
rm
a
ce
u
ti
ca
ls
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
In
c.
8
,3
0
0
2
3
8
8
,1
3
8
1
5
7
5
0
.0
5
4
%
3
.5
2
,0
0
8
1
9
5
1
,9
8
7
2
0
1
0
.0
6
3
%
1
4
.2
M
ea
n
5
,9
3
4
2
5
2
5
,6
9
5
2
3
6
2
0
.0
9
6
%
4
2
.7
4
,2
8
4
3
6
5
4
,0
7
6
2
0
5
3
0
.0
9
1
%
4
7
.0
30
Table 2. Coe¢ cients of the rst lagged dependent variables on the quote model
Table 2 reports the mean of the estimated coe¢ cients for the rst lag of the dependent variables (coe¢ cients
A(1), B and  1 in Equation 1). "Sig + / -" denote the percentage count of number of times the variable
was signicantly positive and negative at the 5% level, respectively, out of a total of 14,400 observations.
Panel A: Lagged Dependent Variables
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
ASKUSt 1 -0.279 0.258 0.073 -0.078
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 88 87 / 0 65 / 0 0 / 67
BIDUSt 1 0.262 -0.274 -0.076 0.075
Sig + / - (in %) 88 / 0 0 / 88 0 / 66 66 / 0
ASKCANt 1 0.174 -0.183 -0.294 0.321
Sig + / - (in %) 90 / 0 0 / 91 0 / 83 86 / 0
BIDCANt 1 -0.177 0.180 0.324 -0.289
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 90 91 / 0 87 / 0 0 / 83
Panel B: Bid-Ask Spread
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
SPREADUSt 1 -0.176 0.184 -0.084 0.087
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 90 91 / 0 0 / 66 67 / 0
SPREADCANt 1 -0.198 0.205 -0.113 0.116
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 90 91 / 0 0 / 62 64 / 0
Panel C: Depth Di¤erence
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
DEPTH_DIFFUSt 1 -0.663 -0.662 0.000 -0.002
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 91 0 / 91 5 / 7 6 / 7
DEPTH_DIFFCANt 1 0.001 0.000 -0.338 -0.347
Sig + / - (in %) 9 / 8 8 / 10 0 / 83 0 / 84
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Table 3. Coe¢ cients of the trade-related variables on the quote model
Table 3 reports the average of the estimated coe¢ cients for the rst lag of the trade-related variables
(coe¢ cients  
(1)
2 ; 
(1)
3 and  4 in Equation 1). "Sig + / -" denote the percentage count of number of times
the variable was signicantly positive and negative at the 5% level, respectively, out of a total of 14,400
observations.
Panel A: Trade Direction
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
BUY USt 1 0.147 0.104 -0.003 0.002
Sig + / - (in %) 71 / 1 51 / 1 0 / 19 18 / 0
SELLUSt 1 -0.104 -0.152 -0.002 0.003
Sig + / - (in %) 1 / 51 1 / 71 0 / 18 20 / 0
BUY CANt 1 -0.004 0.003 0.092 0.076
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 18 16 / 0 42 / 1 32 / 2
SELLCANt 1 -0.002 0.004 -0.091 -0.107
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 16 17 / 0 2 / 30 1 / 41
Panel B: Trade Volume
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
BUY VMEDUSt 1 0.026 0.036 0.000 -0.001
Sig + / - (in %) 11 / 7 12 / 5 3 / 2 2 / 2
SELLVMEDUSt 1 -0.033 -0.026 0.000 0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 6 / 12 7 / 11 3 / 1 1 / 3
BUY VMEDCANt 1 0.001 -0.002 0.081 0.082
Sig + / - (in %) 4 / 3 3 / 4 16 / 4 17 / 4
SELLVMEDCANt 1 0.001 0.000 -0.087 -0.087
Sig + / - (in %) 4 / 3 3 / 4 4 / 16 4 / 16
Panel C: Trade Duration
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
BUY V DURATIONUSt 1 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 13 / 4 20 / 2 16 / 0 0 / 16
SELLV DURATIONUSt 1 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 2 / 21 4 / 13 16 / 0 1 / 16
BUY V DURATIONCANt 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Sig + / - (in %) 16 / 1 1 / 16 7 / 7 11 / 4
SELLV DURATIONCANt 1 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
Sig + / - (in %) 15 / 1 1 / 16 4 / 11 7 / 7
Panel D: Total Trade
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
TOTALBUY US 0.261 0.312 -0.003 0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 66 / 1 74 / 0 1 / 7 4 / 2
TOTALSELLUS -0.393 -0.270 0.001 0.004
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 75 1 / 68 2 / 4 7 / 1
TOTALBUY CAN -0.001 -0.001 0.410 0.409
Sig + / - (in %) 2 / 9 7 / 5 66 / 1 68 / 1
TOTALSELLCAN 0.003 0.006 -0.479 -0.508
Sig + / - (in %) 4 / 7 10 / 2 0 / 70 1 / 68
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Table 4. Coe¢ cients of the rst lagged dependent and liquidity variables on the
implied model
Table 4 reports the mean of the estimated coe¢ cients for the rst lag of the dependent variables. "Sig +
/ -" denote the percentage count of number of times the variable was signicantly positive and negative at
the 5% level, respectively, out of a total of 14,400 observations.
Panel A: Lagged Dependent Variables
SPREADUS SPREADCAN MIDPOINT PREMIUM
MIDPOINTt 1 0.001 -0.002 0.094 -0.063
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 0 0 / 0 55 / 3 1 / 20
PREMIUMt 1 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.759
Sig + / - (in %) 1 / 1 1 / 1 68 / 6 100 / 0
Panel B: Bid-Ask Spread
SPREADUS SPREADCAN MIDPOINT PREMIUM
SPREADUSt 1 0.233 -0.066 0.001 0.001
Sig + / - (in %) 61 / 6 2 / 43 12 / 10 9 / 8
SPREADCANt 1 -0.192 0.352 0.001 0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 88 81 / 0 12 / 12 9 / 9
Panel B: Depth Di¤erence
SPREADUS SPREADCAN MIDPOINT PREMIUM
DEPTH_DIFFUSt 1 -0.003 0.006 -0.470 -0.342
Sig + / - (in %) 3 / 3 2 / 2 0 / 99 4 / 70
DEPTH_DIFFCANt 1 0.000 0.007 -0.175 0.250
Sig + / - (in %) 7 / 5 1 / 1 0 / 93 79 / 1
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Table 5. Coe¢ cients of the trade-related variables on the implied model
Table 5 reports the mean of the estimated coe¢ cients for the rst lag of the trade-related variables (Co-
e¢ cients e (1)2 ; e (1)3 ; and e 4 in Equation 4). "Sig + / -" denote the percentage count of number of times
the variable was signicantly positive and negative at the 5% level, respectively, out of a total of 14,400
observations.
Panel A: Trade Direction
SPREADUS SPREADCAN MIDPOINT PREMIUM
BUY USt 1 0.041 -0.013 0.065 0.118
Sig + / - (in %) 19 / 3 0 / 8 74 / 1 73 / 1
SELLUSt 1 0.044 -0.013 -0.063 -0.121
Sig + / - (in %) 19 / 3 0 / 8 1 / 74 1 / 74
BUY CANt 1 -0.007 0.015 0.043 -0.070
Sig + / - (in %) 2 / 13 2 / 1 49 / 2 2 / 46
SELLCANt 1 -0.004 0.014 -0.038 0.074
Sig + / - (in %) 2 / 12 2 / 1 2 / 48 44 / 2
Panel B: Trade Volume
SPREADUS SPREADCAN MIDPOINT PREMIUM
BUY VMEDUSt 1 -0.013 0.003 0.016 0.035
Sig + / - (in %) 2 / 3 1 / 1 19 / 9 18 / 9
SELLVMEDUSt 1 -0.011 0.004 -0.015 -0.032
Sig + / - (in %) 2 / 3 1 / 1 10 / 19 10 / 18
BUY VMEDCANt 1 0.002 0.002 0.037 -0.069
Sig + / - (in %) 5 / 5 1 / 2 26 / 6 6 / 24
SELLVMEDCANt 1 0.003 -0.001 -0.039 0.079
Sig + / - (in %) 5 / 5 1 / 1 6 / 25 24 / 6
Panel C: Trade Duration
SPREADUS SPREADCAN MIDPOINT PREMIUM
BUY V DURATIONUSt 1 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002
Sig + / - (in %) 1 / 3 9 / 0 23 / 5 25 / 5
SELLV DURATIONUSt 1 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
Sig + / - (in %) 1 / 3 8 / 0 4 / 25 4 / 26
BUY V DURATIONCANt 1 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
Sig + / - (in %) 8 / 4 0 / 1 14 / 10 10 / 13
SELLV DURATIONCANt 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Sig + / - (in %) 8 / 4 0 / 1 10 /15 14 / 9
Panel D: Total Trade
SPREADUS SPREADCAN MIDPOINT PREMIUM
TOTALBUY US -0.027 -0.016 0.154 0.244
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 3 0 / 3 83 / 1 74 / 1
TOTALSELLUS -0.075 -0.010 -0.194 -0.299
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 2 0 / 3 1 / 84 1 / 75
TOTALBUY CAN -0.008 0.006 0.184 -0.334
Sig + / - (in %) 3 / 13 0 / 0 78 / 1 1 / 75
TOTALSELLCAN -0.016 0.044 -0.204 0.392
Sig + / - (in %) 3 / 13 0 / 0 1 / 80 77 / 1
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